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INTRODUCTION

On July 16, 1952, the "Communications Act Amendments, 1952," popularly re-

ferred to as the "McFarland Act Amendments," became law.' After more than five
years of experience under this major procedural revision of the Communications Act
of 1934, as amended, it is time to appraise the effectiveness of the new provisions, as
applied and interpreted by the Federal Communications Commission and the courts.
When the amendments were adopted in 1952, high hopes were held by Congress and
the bar that these important procedural revisions of the basic statute would bring
new clarity to the law, new dispatch and expedition of matters before the Commission, and most important of all, more judicious and fairer treatment of litigants in
adjudicatory proceedings.
The Communications Act Amendments, 1952, were the product of more than
a decade of investigations, studies, and hearings. All segments of the broadcasting
industry, as well as other interested parties, participated in formulating this "new
look" in Commission proceedings. Though there was considerable disagreement by
the Commission with a few provisions of the new amendments, generally the parties
who participated were enthusiastic about the benefits to be gained.' The Senate
Committee Report had this to say:3
Your Committee is strongly of the opinion that enactment of the bill is a major step
forward in the evolution of the regulation of radio and wire communications, both
broadcast and common carrier. It believes that the legislation will be of inestimable value
in making more certain that regulation of the industry shall be in "the public interest,
convenience, and necessity."
Have the Commission and the public benefited substantially, as anticipated by
Congress and the bar? The answer to this question would seem to be "No." In
fact, in some major respects, the new amendments have caused more administrative
problems and greater hardship to litigants. Before setting forth the support for
*A.B. 1948, University of illinois; LL.B. 195i, Harvard University. Member of the District of
Columbia bar.
1 66 SA'Ar. 711, 47 U.S.C. § 153 (1952). The basic act is the Communications Act of 1934, 48 STAT.
zo64, 47 U.S.C. § 1x5 et seq. (1952).
'See, e.g., Wall and Jacob, Communications Act Amendments, z952-Clarity or Ambigtdty, 4 Gro.
L. J. 135, 179 (1953); Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Communications Act Amendments, 1952, H.R. RaP. No. 1750, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952).
a Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Communications Act Amendments, 1951, S. REP.
No. 44, 82d Cong., ist Sess. 3 (951).
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this thesis, it would be well to describe briefly the salient procedural changes or
clarifications resulting from the 1952 amendments. No attempt will be made to
describe them all. A listing of the high.points is enough to demonstrate the purpose
and scope of the 1952 changes.
Sections 5 and 4o9 deal with the organization and functions of the Commission.
Section 54 was amended by the 1952 Act so as to provide that the Commission should
organize its staff into "integrated bureaus," by function, including in each bureau
such legal, engineering, accounting, and administrative personnel as may be necessary.
For example, the "Broadcast Bureau" would handle radio, television, and related
matters; the "Common Carrier" Bureau would handle telephone, telegraph and
other common-carrier activities. Even prior to the adoption of the 1952 amendments, the Commission had, in fact, divided its staff into these functional bureaus;
thus, the 1952 amendments merely codified this division.' A new section 5(c) was
added to the Act; it created a "review staff," whose duties were to assist the Commission in cases of "adjudication which have been designated for hearing," by preparing for commission use a compilation and summary of facts material to the
exceptions and replies filed after an initial decision; the "review staff" also prepares,
upon specific direction, final and interlocutory opinions, memoranda or orders. The
"review staff" is expressly forbidden from "recommending" a decision to the Commission in any matter; it is set entirely apart from every other department; its members cannot consult with any other staff members; nor can any other member of
the staff perform "review staff" functions.
Section 4o96 was amended to supplement this "separation of functions." It now
requires that all adjudicatory hearings shall be conducted either by an examiner or
by the full Comr~ission, but not by one Commissioner. An initial decision must be
prepared by the hearing officer, except in emergency circumstances. The examiner
cannot consult any person, except on the record, on any fact or question of law in
issue, even including another examiner; nor can he advise the Commission with
regard to his initial decision. No persons who participated in the investigation or
preparation of a given case, no member of the Office of the General Counsel, the
Chief Engineer, or the Chief Accountant shall make any additional presentation
in the case, except upon the record in open hearing. All of these provisions are
directed towards separating with finality the prosecuting and judicial functions of the
Commission.
Section 3097 of the Act was also extensively amended to make definite and certain
the procedural steps involved in securing a license. The 1952 amendments were
intended to set forth specifically "the procedural rights and remedies of those who
oppose, as well as those who apply for, a new instrument of authorization." ' Section
'66 STAT. 72, 47 U.S.C. § 155 (1952).
" Wall and Jacob, supra note 2, at 145.
* 66 STAT. 721, 47 U.S.C. § 409 (1952).
166 STAT. 715, 47 U.S.C. § 309 (1952).

' Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, supra note 3, at 8..
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now requires that before designation for hearing, the Commission must
,notify in writing the applicant and other known parties in interest as to why the
grant cannot be made; the applicant can reply to this letter. If still unable to make
the grant, the Commission shall designate the application for hearing and it must
-specify with "particularity" the matters in issue. Any "party in interest" is given
.the right to intervene in the proceeding. The hearing held thereafter shall be a
"'full" evidentiary hearing.
A new subsection, section 309(c), established what is now referred to as the
"protest" rule, whereby any grant made without hearing remains subject to "protest"
or objection by any "party in interest" for a period of thirty days. If a "protest" is
filed, it must set forth the facts showing "protestant" to be a "party in interest" and
must specify with particularity the "facts, matters, and things relied upon" to show
that the grant will not serve the public interest. If the Commission finds that the
protest meets these requirements, it shall designate the application for hearing upon
-the issues set forth by the protestant, except where, after giving oral argument, the
,Commission finds no basis for setting aside the grant, even assuming the truth of the
factual allegations in the protest. Pending final decision, the effectiveness of the
grant is postponed, unless necessary to the maintenance of an existing service or
unless the Commission affirmatively finds that the public interest requires that the
grant remain in effect.
Section 3 1o(b) 9 of the Act, dealing with assignments and transfers of broadcast
licenses, was amended so as to prohibit the so-called "Avco" procedure, whereby the
-Commission permitted any well-qualified bidder to apply for the frequency being
-sold, hence necessitating a hearing to determine which was the best-qualified buyer.
'The 1952 amendments expressly forbade this result. Here again, though, the "Avco"
procedure had already been abandoned, prior to the adoption of this Act; 10 the
1952 amendments resulted only in forbidding its reintroduction. Section 31211 was
amended so as to give the Commission the power to issue "cease and desist" orders,
:after notice and hearing. Thus, an additional administrative sanction, short of revocation or failure to renew, was made available. Finally, the judicial review sections,
sections 402(a) and 4 02(b) 1 2 were extensively revised so as to clarify existing law
and make clear and certain rights on appeal. The court was also given the power

3 09 (b)

to grant temporary relief and was given some supervisory power over Commission
action after remand.

This brief summary of the major procedural revisions indicates the intent
-of Congress to clarify the procedural rights of litigants and to guarantee a fairer hearing. As indicated before, it is believed that the 1952 amendments have not done
the job expected. However, any criticism of the 1952 amendments, and the results
thereunder, must be tempered by one important observation. During this past five966

STAT. 716, 47 U.S.C. § 3xo(b) (i952).
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, supra note 3, at 9.
" 66 STAT. 716, 47 U.S.C. § 312 (952).
1'66 STAT. 719, 47 U.S.C. § 402 (1952).
10

COMiMUNIcATIoNs Acr

AMENDMENTS, 1952

675

year period, the Commission has been faced with a terrific workload. The major
increase in workload has resulted from the processing of new television applications,
which obviously would have strained any procedure, good or bad. Nevertheless,
the 1952 amendments have contributed to the difficulties. The stringent prehearing
procedures of section 3o9(b), the hearing requirements of section 409, the intervention requirements of section 3o9 (b), the protest provisions of section 309(c), the
separation of functions provisions of section 5(c)-these and similar provisions
enacted in 1952 certainly guarantee a full hearing in all conceivable adjudicatory proceedings. But with such procedures, substantial delay, expense, and occasional unfairness have been the inevitable result.
Thirty-five percent of all broadcast applications are required to go through hearing.
There is an average of two hearings each Commission workday.'3 Some television
cases have taken more than four years before final decision, from the time the applications were filed. In "protest" cases under section 309(c), where the Act specifically
directs the Commission to "expedite" consideration of the matters raised, hearings
normally take more than a year. A lawyer today advises his client in a normal
case likely to be designated for hearing that he should not expect final decision in less
than two years from the filing of his application.
Is this substantial delay and expense, stemming in part from the 1952 procedural
amendments, justified by the quality or fairness of the results? It is commonly
believed that one principal advantage of administrative action is supposed to be its
speed and flexibility of decision. It is perhaps better, from the point of view of the
listening public, particularly in comparative hearings where a number of wellqualified applicants are competing, that there be a prompt result, rather than necessarily the most just result. If these administrative advantages of speed and dispatch
are to be sacrificed, has this loss been offset by the high quality of the end product?
Here, again, the answer would seem to be "No." And again the responsibility for
the negative answer in some measure rests with the i952 amendments, themselves.
The "separation of functions" provisions have proved particularly troublesome (sections 5 and 409); the extensive procedural requirements, particularly the "protest"
provisions, have contributed to a great deal of vacillation, poorly-reasoned opinions,
and interminable litigation (section 309(c)).

There is but one major criteria of effective administrative action left: have the
1952 amendments contributed substantially towards fairer and more just decisions?

It might well be argued that in the interest of absolute fairness to the private parties
involved, the delay and loss of efficiency are worthwhile. During the hearings on the
1952 amendments, Congress was impressed with the charges that applicants "have
not always had the most equitable judicial treatment."' 4 Prior to Y952, there had
been considerable criticism of particular activities, practices, and excesses. But the
system, as such, was not unfair. The 1952 amendments attempted to guarantee fair" FCC,

TwENTY-SacoND ANNr. REI. 8 (x956).
1, Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, supra note 3, at 6.
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ness, however, by describing in some detail the exact procedures the Commision
had to follow and by taking from the Commission certain areas of administrative
discretion. This attempt to legislate administrative morality has not been successful.
The limitation on discretion does not necessarily improve the integrity of the process
or the ability of the administrators.
As will appear later, the "protest" provisions as originally enacted have placed
the Commission in an administrative strait-jacket. The public's interest in receiving
greater service has been sacrificed, through loss of discretion, to the purely private
interest of competitors seeking delay and obstruction. This attempt to legislate
"fairness" has only led to a greater "unfairness," with the public the principal loser.
So also the "separation of functions" provisions have not brought about any substantially fairer results. All the separation provisions do is to separate, in adjudicatory
matters, the Commission from most of its staff. Granted that staff members might
become sufficiently powerful or persuasive as to bring about an improper exercise of
influence, it is still questionable whether staff influence, as such, is a significant or
present danger to a fair hearing on the record.
The 1952 amendments have attempted to deal with one of the most difficult
and delicate problems facing the administrative process-namely, how can the needs
of the agency for consultation, advice, and information from all sources be accommodated to the need for a fair decision on the record in those situations where a record
is required? The 1952 amendments dealing with internal separation have touched
upon one minor aspect of this total problem. Influences and pressures are brought
to bear in Commission proceedings. There is no question of that."' Most of the
pressures, however, originate from persons entirely outside the agency. The effectiveness of these pressures cannot, of course, be accurately evaluated. Whatever their
effectiveness, and certainly there is some, they are contrary to the basic principle that
in adjudicatory matters at least, the decision must be based solely on the record.
More will be said about this later. But suffice it to say now, that where "separation
of functions" is most needed-to defend against these pressures stemming from
sources outside of the Commission-the 1952 amendments have had no applicability.
The foregoing summary has pointed out the major respects in which the Communications Act Amendments, 1952, have not fulfilled the high hopes of their proponents. There hereafter follows a more detailed documentation to support the
basic thesis that efficiency and expedition have been sacrificed, with no appreciable
improvement in fairness to the parties.
lI
SEPARATION OF FUNCTIONS

The "separation of functions" provisions of sections 5(c) and 409 have already

been briefly described in the introduction. The appropriate provisons are set forth
5

Jaffe, The Scandal in TV Licensing, Harper's Magazine, Sept. 1957, P. 77.
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below.'
A mere reading of these provisions demonstrates the extensive attempt
made by Congress to insulate the staff from the Commissioners, themselves, and to
limit the activities of the various staff members who participate at one stage or another
in the adjudicatory hearing process. The seven Commissioners and their personal
professional assistants thus bear a tremendous burden. In practice, they simply cannot do an adequate job. The Commissioners are busy men. As of June 1957, more
than x,8ooooo radio authorizations were outstanding, including 774 television authorizations and 3,238 standard broadcast authorizations. During the fiscal year ending
June 30, 1957, more than 500,000 applications were filed-i 9 oo applications were
filed each day, as well as innumerable pleadings, petitions and letters. On June 30,
7
1957, there were 360 hearing cases pending.'
The problems requiring the personal attention of the Commissioners vary from
the most routine administrative matter to the most complex rule-making proceeding.
For example, in the case of the subscription television rule-making proposal, 25,ooo
pleadings, letters, documents and cards were filed.'
Obviously, with this heavy
workload, there is a need for flexibility in the use of available manpower. Yet, the
"separation of functions" provisions have not permitted this needed flexibility in
adjudicatory proceedings. Two glaring bottlenecks have developed-one with the
2 Section 5(c) provides in pertinent part (66 STAT. 7,2, 47 U.S.C. § 155 (1952)):
The Commission shall establish a special staff of employees . . . which shall consist of such legal,
engineering, accounting and other personnel as the Commission deems necessary. The review staff shall
be directly responsible to the Commission and shall not be made a part of any bureau or divisional
organization of the Commission. . . . [It] shall perform no duties or functions other than to assist
the Commission, in cases of adjudication . . . which have been designated for hearing, by preparing a
summary of the evidence presented at any such hearing, by preparing, after an initial decision but prior
to oral argument, a compilation of the facts material to the exceptions and replies thereto . . . and by
preparing for the Commission . . . without recommendations and in accordance with specific directions
from the Commission . . . memoranda, opinions, decisions, and orders. The Commission shall not
permit any employee who is not a member of the review staff to perform the duties and functions which
are to be performed by the review staff...."
Sec. 409(c) provides in pertinent part (66 STAT. 721, 47 U.S.C. § 409 (1952)):

"§ 409(c)(1) In any case of adjudication . . . which has been designated for a hearing by the
Commission, no examiner conducting or participating in the conduct of such hearing shall, except to the
extent required for the disposition of ex parte matters as authorized by law, consult any person . . . on
any fact or question of law in issue, unless upon notice and opportunity for all parties to participate ....
No Examiner conducting or participating in the conduct of any such hearing shall advise or consult with
the Commission . . . or employee of the Commission . . . with respect to the initial decision in the
case or with respect to exceptions taken .....
"§ 4o9(c)(2) In any case of adjudication . . . which has been designated for a hearing by the
Commission, no person who has participated in the presentation or preparation or preparation for
presentation of such case before an examiner. . . . and no member of the Office of the General Counsel,
the Office of the Chief Engineer, or the Office of the Chief Accountant shall . . . directly or indirectly
make any additional presentation respecting such case, unless upon notice and opportunity for all parties
to participate.
"§ 409(c) (3) No person or persons engaged in the performance of investigative or prosecuting
functions for the Commission, or in any litigation before any court in any case arising under this Act,
shall advise, consult, or participate in any case of adjudication . . . which has been designated for a
hearing by the Commission, except as a witness or counsel in public proceedings."
'" FCC, TwasE.-N-TmrD ANN.
iEP. 1, 3, 4, 21, 25, 125 (1957).
"s FCC, op. cit. sulpra note 13, at

oo.
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Commissioners, themselves, since they must personally decide these various matters
with little assistance, the other with the "review staff," or what has been officially
designated "Office of Opinions and Review." This small and independent section
has imposed upon it a tremendous paper workload. In every adjudicatory decision,
large or small, interlocutory or final, a member of the "review staff" must thoroughly
familiarize himself with all aspects of the case and write a complete and accurate
summary of all relevant evidence and material points involved. Then he must write
the final decision after instructions by the Commission.
It is believed that in matters as important and complex as the adjudicatory cases,
the Commission should have available the best internal counseling and assistance
possible from as many sources as possible, consistent with basic principles of administrative fairness as set forth in section five of the Administrative Procedure Act of
1946.19 As has been mentioned before "separation of functions" within the agency
is simply one aspect of the general'goal of guaranteeing in adjudicatory matters a
decision based upon a record made in open hearing. The difficulty arises in accommodating this basic goal to the over-all needs, functions, and status of the independent
regulatory agency. In the case of broadcasting, the Commission is dealing with a
dynamic growth industry of tremendous potential. A television or radio franchise
can be tremendously valuable.2 ° So also, the common carrier and industrial uses of
radio, as yet in their infancy, already involve multi-million dollar investments. Both
radio and television have an unequalled ability to bring entertainment, education,
and information to the public. This potential for influence and financial gain has
not been overlooked by the astute business, entertainment, and educational interests.
All of these interests are clamoring for a share of the spectrum. The pressures,
therefore, upon the Commission are intense. In almost all cases, the pressures
emanate from sources outside the Commission. These outside pressures exist whether
or not the matter at issue concerns administrative processing, rule-making or adjudication. It is asking too much, in our present administrative scheme, to expect administrators to resist or ignore these pressures entirely. The Commission has administrative and rule-making functions in which interested parties are encouraged to
confer and consult with the Commission so that it can better appreciate the needs
and interests of the business it is regulating. Hence, the habit of direct consultation
by interested parties is part of the process and is well-established."'
Also, the Commission is an agency of the Congress. Though an independent
regulatory agency, it is still directly responsible for the implementation of congres11 6o

STAT. 239 (946),

5 U.S.C. § 1004 (r952).

20During X957, Station WNEW (AM), New York, N. Y., sold for $5,x6o,8oo, in 1955, Station
WDTV (TV), Pittsburgh, Pa., sold for $9,750,000. See FCC, op. cit. supra note x7, at 123.
1
" See Van Curler Broadcasting Corp. v. United States, 236 F.2d 727, 73, (D.C. Cir. 1956), where
the Court of Appeals condoned the practice of consulting with the Commission, ex parte, so long as not
connected to specific docketed rule-making proceedings. Even in adjudicatory comparative hearings, the
process of judgment and selection rests on informed discretion and experience, not readily apparent from
a mere study of the record. See Pinellas Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 230 F.2d 204, 206 (D.C. Cir.
t956).
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sional policy. At any time, Congress can limit appropriations, thus limiting personnel
and activities, or enact substantive legislation dictating policy and procedures. Because
Congress is charged with the responsibility of appropriating money for these agencies
and supervising their activities, individual congressmen are besieged with requests
and demands for the adoption of a certain policy, or the deletion of certain powers,
or the grant of a particular permit or privilege. As might be expected, congressmen
have been quick to respond to the pleas of their constituents, as well as to recognize
an occasional political "issue" upon which they can capitalize. There have been interminable congressional investigations of the Commission.2 2 In 1956, there were at
least 14 separate congressional committees or subcommittees probing the affairs of the

Commission. 3 Even where matters were pending at the Commission in formal
docketed proceedings, congressional committees or individual congressmen held hearings and issued reports urging the Commission to adopt a certain, often highly controversial, solution.24
Other influences brought to bear are not so open or brazen. But they do, in fact,
occur, and they occur outside the formal record. The habit of consultation by con-

gressmen, members of the executive departments and interested parties is, thus, wellestablished, if not inherent in the system. Obviously, this habit of consultation inevitably is sometimes brought to bear in specific adjudicatory proceedings. The habit
of consultation, once established, is not easily broken.
The 1952 amendments have not changed this situation. They have insulated the
Commission from its own staff and established elaborate hearing procedures,but the
amendments have not insulated the Commission in adjudicatory proceedings from
Congress, the executive, or the public. Lack of fairness-if by what we mean pressures brought to bear dehors the record-still persists. Justification for a serious
reappraisal of our system is certainly present today, but it is not the purpose of this
article to do more than state the facts as they exist. The facts are that "separation
of functions" as found in the 1952 amendments do not reach the source of the most
serious threats to a decision based on the record. Yet, the amendments do result
in a serious loss of administrative flexibility, efficiency, and expedition.
The basic principles of separation of functions must be observed in any fair
administrative adjudicatory process. The investigating and prosecuting functions of
the Commission should be entirely separated from the decisional processes. To this
extent, a separation of personnel and departments is both necessary and desirable.
"'The Commission estimates that in the fiscal year 1956, it devoted 3 ' man-years in preparation for
and attendance at congressional hearings.

See FCC, op. ct. supra note 13, at 7-8.
2' Broadcasting-Telecasting Magazine, December 31, 1956, p. 42; id., July 30, 1956, p. 46.

"For example, while a final television decision was pending, word spread that a subsidiary of
National Airlines would be favored; three senators wrote the Commission raising policy questions regarding
propriety of grant to a certified airline. Broadcasting-Telecasting Magazine, Jan. 28, 1957, p. 50. And
in the summer of 1956, while highly controversial rule-making proceedings were pending affecting
specific cases in thirteen markets, an Interim Report was issued by a majority of the Senate Committee
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, urging the adoption of a particular solution. See Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Interim Report, The Television Inquiry, S. REP. No. 2769, 84th
Cong., 2d Sess. 8-1i (1956).
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The examiners must be independent and must function purely as judges. Actually,
this separation has been accomplished at the Commission without the benefit of the
1952 amendments. The Administrative Procedure Act 25 helps to guarantee this result. A separate "Office of Hearing Examiners" is established. The Commission
is now divided into functional bureaus, one of which is the "Broadcast Bureau."
Its responsibility is to process broadcast applications, check complaints, investigate
violations, draft proposed broadcast rules and regulations, and, finally, to participate as
a "party" in any formal hearings designated by the Commission. The Broadcast
Bureau may be considered an administrative "district attorney's office." On the
other hand, the General Counsel's Office, the Chief Engineer, and the Office of
Opinions and Review are entirely separate from the Broadcast Bureau, and they have
no prosecuting functions at all. Thus, there is an effective separation of functions,
organizationally speaking, without regard to the detailed and specific requirements
of the 1952 amendments.

Fortunately, efforts are being made by the Commission and others, looking
towards a re-evaluation of the internal separation of functions provisions as they now
exist. Legislative proposals are being prepared which will permit the Commission
greater discretion to consult with key staff officers when these persons are not engaged in investigating or prosecuting functions.2 0 It is believed that legislative approval of these changes is in order. After all, a sense of "judiciousness" and basic
integrity cannot be legislated. A really effective "separation of functions" will result
from acceptance of basic principles of fairness, leaving the detailed implementation
to informed and honest administrators.
III
SECTION 309 (c) "PROTEST"
None of the 1952 amendments have caused so much difficulty and delay and so
much dissatisfaction as the "protest" provisions of section 309(c). As originally
enacted in 1952, section 309(c) of the Act reads as follows:27
(c) When any instrument of authorization is granted by the Commission without a
-hearing as provided in subsection (a) hereof, such grant shall remain subject to protest
as hereinafter provided for a period of thirty days. During such thirty-day period any
party in interest may file a protest under oath directed to such grant and request a hearing
on said application so granted. Any protest so filed shall contain such allegations of fact
as will show the protestant to be a .party in interest and shall specify with particularity the
facts, matters and things relied upon, but shall not include issues or allegations phrased
generally. The Commission shall within fifteen days from the date of the filing of such
protest, enter findings as to whether such protest meets the foregoing requirements and
if it so finds the application involved shall be set for hearing upon the issues set forth in
said protest, together with such further specific issues, if any, as may be prescribed by the
2160 STAr. 237-44 (1946), 5 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1I (1952).
2 FCC, op. cite supra note 13, at 24; id., TWENTY-FxRsT ANN. REP. 18 (955).
2766 STAT. 715, 47 U.S.C. § 309(c) (x952). The 1952 amendments gave the Commission only
15 days to act on a protest. This was extended to 3o days in 1954. 68 STAT. 35 (1954), 47 U.S.C.
§ 309C (Supp. III, 1956).
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Commission. In any hearing subsequently held upon such application all issues specified
by the Commission shall be tried in the same manner provided in subsection (b) hereof,
but with respect to all issues set forth in the protest and not specifically adopted by the

Commission, both the burden of proceeding with the introduction of evidence and the
burden of proof shall be upon the protestant.

The hearing and determination of cases

arising under this subsection shall be expedited by the Commission and pending hearing and decision the effective date of the Commission's action to which protest is made

shall be postponed to the effective date of the Commission's decision after hearing, unless
the authorization involved is necessary to the maintenance or conduct of an existing

service, in which event the Commission shall authorize the applicant to utilize the facilities
or authorization in question pending the Commission's decision after hearing.

This was a highly controversial section, even when placed in the i952 law. Legislative
history is replete with statements by official spokesmen for the Commission that
protests by persons with an economic interest will burden the Commission's processes
and delay the advent of new radio and television service.28 Yet, still Congress
passed the new bill.
It is important, therefore, to determine what this new section was originally intended to accomplish. This subsection applies only to grants made without hearing,
pursuant to section 3o9(a). Any objections made by outside parties to the grant of a
proposed application were considered by the Commission at the time it made its
grant. History had shown that in situations like this, even though the Commission's
Rules prior to 1952 permitted the filing of a protest, and even though section 405 of
the Act permitted reconsideration and rehearing, in fact the Commission was very
lax and dilatory in its consideration of the objections by outsiders. Considerable
periods of time would pass before the objections were considered; in the meantime,
the station whose authorization was being protested had completed construction and
was on the air. This, of course, vitiated the effectiveness of the objections. Furthermore, acceptance or not of the objections rested solely within the discretion of the
Commission. Its disposition was usually by summary order, with almost no discussion of the errors urged.
The new section 309(c) was designed to make "definite and certain the procedural rights and remedies" of objectors to the grants, as well as the applicants themselves. The section gave to any person who has the right to challenge the propriety
of the grant by appeal to the courts the preliminary right to complain first to the
agency, and his complaint had to be acted upon within 30 days. The section provided that if a person shows himself to be a "party in interest" and if he set forth
his objections "with particularity," then he was entitled not only to a hearing on his
objections, but also to a stay of the effectiveness of the grant, except in those cases
where the grant was necessary to the "maintenance or conduct of an existing
service."
28 See, e.g., Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce on S. 1973, 8sst Cong., Ist Sess. 17, 34 (1949); Hearings before the House Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce on S. 658, 82d Cong., ist Sess. 69-70 (1951); Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, supra note 3, at 8.
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In most cases where the protest was granted, the new authorization was stopped
dead in its tracks. This was so, regardless of the likelihood of eventual success on
the merits, regardless of the need for the new service, and regardless of the motives
or purpose of the protesting party. The party most likely to suffer economic injury
was the direct competitor of the new station in the market or area involved. It
becomes obvious that a tremendously potent weapon was available to existing stations
seeking to preserve the status quo, to limit competition, or at least to delay competition for as long as possible. Thus, section 309(c), almost as if by intent, became
a tool for existing competitors seeking to prevent or delay new competition.
To appreciate the significance of this, it is necessary to understand a basic principle of communications law as set forth in the landmark case, FCC v. Sanders Bros.
Radio Station.29 In the Sanders decision, the sole existing station in the community
objected to the grant of a new second station, claiming there was insufficient advertising revenue to support both stations. The Commission refused to consider this
factor, holding that economic injury to an existing station was not grounds for
refusing to license a newcomer. The Commission also argued that since the existing
station could not assert economic injury to itself as a grounds for denying a license,
it had no standing to appeal stemming from this economic injury. Absence of right,
it was argued, implies absence of remedy.
The Supreme Court established two principles in its decision. First, the Court
held that resulting economic injury to a rival station "is not in and of itself, and
apart from considerations of public convenience, interest, or necessity, an element the
petitioner must weigh and as to which it must make findings in passing on an
application for a broadcast license."" ° Second, despite the Commission's claim
that "absence of right implies absence of remedy," the Court held that the Act still
confers upon persons "likely to be financially injured" by the grant the right to
prosecute an appeal.
Thus, in communications law, there is the curious but well-established principle
that an existing station likely to be economically injured has the right to object to a
new grant; yet, the existing station cannot assert its own economic injury as a substantive reason for denying the new grant. It must find other reasons why the
grant is improper. It is this limited principle of "standing" which has been the
foundation for almost every protest filed during the past five years. Two principal
difficulties have developed. In the first place, competitors who obviously had "standing" began to utilize section 309(c) as a delaying device, upon the flimsiest pretext
and without any real substance to their case. Second, the Commission, itself, attempting to defend against this type of flimsy protest, went way too far in frustrating
the procedural remedies available under section 3o9(c). Needless to say, its efforts
caused only further litigation, delay, expense, and frustration.
There are four areas where the Commission's overzealous attempts to limit
the protest provisions have caused serious problems:
o .o9U.S. 470 (940).
-o1d. at 473.
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(i) Defining who are "parties in interest, entitled to 'protest' ";
(2) Defining the degree of "particularity and specificity" -necessary to state, in the
protest, an adequate showing of irregularity or illegality;
(3) Defining the nature and extent of the protest hearing; and
(4) Determining whether to issue a "stay" of the grant where the protest is set
for hearing.
The most troublesome issue has been that of defining who is a "party in interest."
Legislative history was presumably very clear on this, for the senate report said:"'
'(P)arties in interest' because of electrical interference are fixed and defined by the
Supreme Court decision in the KOA case (319 U.S. 239) and the Commission's rules and
regulations; 'parties in interest' from an economic standpoint are defined by the Supreme
Court decision in the Sanders case (309 U.S. 470).
Significantly, section 309(c) is not needed where the "protestant" bases his claim
upon objectionable interference. The Supreme Court in FCC v. NBC (KOA), 2 had
already ruled that if objectionable interference is caused to an existing station, the
station's license is, in effect, being modified and a hearing is necessary. The present
section 316 of the Act expressly covers modification cases and provides much more
effective procedural protections for a station whose license is being modified than
does section 309(c) .s Therefore, the only important application of section 309(c)
is to cases where the protestant's claim to standing is based on economic injury.
The Commission decided in the beginning that one effective way to cut down the
applicability of the protest provisions was simply to define narrowly the class of
persons entitled to invoke that section. Indeed, one of the very earliest decisions decided that an existing radio station could not protest the grant of a new television
station, since they were not in direct competition.3 4 The loser immediately appealed;
while the appeal was pending, the Commission reversed itself and agreed to let the
protest lie 35
Another early case involved two stations 330 miles apart. Obviously, the stations
were not competitors, but the grant of improved facilities to one caused interference
to a large part of the other's service area, though outside the area entitled to protection. The station losing service claimed that it sold advertising based on the
tremendous area it covered. Thus, the loss of service area would make the station
less attractive to advertisers. The Commission refused to find standing on these
facts.3 However, on appeal, the court of appeals held that the station losing service
was a party in interest to the grant and that there was a satisfactory showing of "a
37
likelihood of injury" within a meaning of the Sanders case
" Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, supra note 3, at 8.
'2319 U.S. 239 (1943).
3a 66 STAT. 717, 47 U.S.C. § 316 (1952).
"Versluis Radio and Television, 9 PIE & FISCH.ER RAmo RaG. 104 (953) [hereinafter cited as
"R.R."]
3"9 R.R. 102 (1953). Other cases reaffirmed this. See, e.g., T. E. Allen & Sons, 9 R.R. 197 (1953);
Salinas Broadcasting Corp., 9 R.R. 192 (1953).

"'Alvarado Broadcasting Co. (KOAT), io R.R. 382a (954).
'7 Metropolitan Television Co. v. United States, 221 F.2d 879 (D.C. Cir. 31955).
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The Commission has permitted protests by newspapers to the grant of a new television station 3" and to the renewal of a standard broadcast license, 9 on the theory
that both newspapers and radio or television are competing for the local advertising
4°
dollar. The Commission was not so liberal in the case of W. Wright Esch. In
this case, the protestants objected to the approval of an assignment of license, alleging
that they had an option agreement with the licensee to purchase the radio station but
that instead the licensee sold the station to a third party. The protestants stated
that they were suing the licensee in the state courts to enforce the option contract, but
that if the Commission approved the assignment, their contractual rights would be
impaired. The Commission held that the protestants had no standing. On appeal,
the court of appeals reversed, finding that this contractual right gave protestants 41a
sufficient "interest" in the assignment so as to qualify them as "parties in interest.
The Commission was not to be outdone, though. The state trial court at a later
date decided that the option contract was not enforceable; the protestants appealed this
decision to a higher state court. While the appeal was pending, the parties to the
transfer filed a petition for reconsideration before the Commission. The CommisThe Commission held that since the claim to
sion thereupon dismissed the protest
standing rested on the alleged contractual rights which the trial court had now found
to be unenforceable, the protestants no longer had standing. It would seem that
since an appeal from the trial court was pending, the Commission's action is unduly
restrictive 3
The Commission has consistently held that mere applicants do not have standing
to protest the grant of another pending application.4 4 These decisions follow an
earlier court of appeals decision in Mansfield Journal Company v. FCC!' On occasion, however, the court of appeals has approved objections in the nature of a protest
brought by applicants. For example, in McClatchy Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,40 on rehearing, the court permitted an unsuccessful comparative applicant in a television case,
while its appeal was pending, to "protest" a modification of construction permit of the
successful applicant in the comparative case. The court thought the grant of the
modification application substantially changed the successful applicant's original
proposal, thereby prejudicing the unsuccessful applicant.
One test the Commission has used, with varying success, to limit the class of
persons entitled to be considered "parties in interest" is its "new injury" test, i.e., the
Commission requires that the protestant show likelihood of economic injury stemming solely and directly from the particular action being protested. For example,
where an applicant files an application for additional time to construct its station, the
3 Ohio Valley Broadcasting Corp., io

R.R. 452

(954).

4012
"Richland (WMAN), 13 R.R. 113 (1955)
"Granik v. FCC, 234 F.2d 682 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
'-W. Wright Esch, 14 R.R. x65 (1957).
"The protestants have appealed the decision. Granik v.
"' ans Lansdown (KRKS), 14 R.R. 488 (956); Central
zi R.R. 484 (1954).
45 173 F.zd 646 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
d173

R.R. 125ob (z955).

FCC, Case Nos. 13730 and 13731.
City-Greenville Broadcasting Co. (WNTA),
R.R. 2072 (1956).
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Commission has held that no protest will lieY It claims that Congress did not
intend to allow protests to later Commission actions which do not change the
competitive situation from that present at the time of the original grant.48 There
may be some justification for this, since an application for extension of time
does not change in a material way the actual proposals which were approved at the
time of the original grant. But what about the situation where the application for
modification of permit actually changes substantially some of the legal, technical,
financial, or other aspects of the operation?
This problem arose in the case of Midwest Television.49 Here, the applicant proposed to change its transmitter site so as to place a substantially better technical
service over protestant's city. The protestant objected to this move, claiming that
this would cause more direct competition with its own station than under the prior
grant. Despite some doubts, the Commission found that the protestant was a part)
in interest because the move in transmitter location substantially changed the competitive situation. This decision seems clearly correct, since, in effect, protestant was
being faced with a new competitor.50
Yet, in other cases, where the factual situations are hard to distinguish, the Commission has refused to find a new competitive injury and has denied standing.5' In
Spartan Radiocasting Company," the applicant proposed a new location for its
transmitter 25 miles away from its original site and five miles from the protestant's
city. The protestant claimed not only would this new location increase the competition between the stations, but also the new transmitter site would enable the applicant to obtain a network affiliation not otherwise available to it. The Commission
held that protestant had no standing because there was no fundamental change in
the basic competitive situation, it being speculative as to whether the move would
cause new injury from that the protestants would have suffered under the original
grant. The protestants appealed this decision, claiming that a showing of "new
injury" was not necessary under section 309(c), and also, even if it was necessary, a
sufficient showing had been made. The court of appeals did not decide the validity of
the Commission's new injury test. It did decide, however, that a sufficient showing
of new injury had been made on the facts, namely, the protestants' allegation that
only by moving to the new location could the applicant obtain a network affiliation.5 3
The Commission also tried to apply the "new injury" test to cases involving the
sale of broadcast stations, so as to deny standing. In the case of Leo Howard,54 a
'8 Channel i6 of Rhode Island, so R.R. 377 (1954).

" For example, § 319(c) of the Act expressly exempts license grants from protests, 66 STAT. 718, 47

U.S.C. § 319(c) (1952), because a license follows almost automatically from the grant of an original
construction permit, which is subject to protest. Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, supra
note 2, at ii.

"09 R.R. 611 (1953).
'0Ct. Gulf Television Co., ii R.R. 46o (I954); Van Curler Broadcasting Corp., ii R.R. 215 (954).
"See, e.g., Southwestern Publishing Co., ii R.R. 466 0954).
62 io R.R. 28r, 287 (1954).
"sGreenville Television Co. v. FCC, 221 F.2d 870 (D.C. Cir. 5955).
U 9 R.R. 359 (1953).
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radio station protested the assignment of a construction permit of its competitor.
The new station had not, in fact, been built; a construction permit only was being
assigned. The Commission concluded that since the protestant had not protested
the original grant to the assignor, it could not protest the assignment since no new
injury would be caused. The court of appeals, however, rejected this argument.5 5
The court held that the Act expressly permitted the protest of assignments and transfers. As long as the station protesting was an existing competitor, its rights to protest
did not depend on whether new or different injury would be caused.
The court, however, did not expressly reject the "new injury" test. Later, the
Commission once again applied its "new injury" test in a transfer case, James
Robert Meachem.5 6 Here, a television permittee protested the transfer of its competitor's radio and television station to a large corporation. The Commission held
that the protestant had no standing. It attempted to distinguish the Camden decision
by claiming that Camden dealt with the transfer of a station which was not yet on
the air; thus, the protestant would be suffering a new injury when the assigned
station-took the air. This attempted distinction is clearly erroneous, since the court
of appeals decision was simply based on the proposition that the Act expressly permits protests of transfers and assignments. Nevertheless, the Meachem case was
never appealed and, thus, it still stands as precedent.
It is believed that when the "new injury" test is presented squarely to the court,
it will be rejected. Any authorization results in a permission to construct or
operate. From a purely technical point of view, "new injury" is established
each time the applicant actually commences construction or operation under the
new authorization. Thus, the "new injury" test is not really helpful. A more
appropriate analysis would look to the nature of the objections raised. If the objections should have been raised, or could have been raised, within 30 days from
the grant of the original construction permit, then any rights to raise such objections
expire with the passage of the 3o-day protest period. However, where the objections
raised by the protestant concern only the actual new authorization, or concern facts
only coming to protestant's attention at the time of new grant, the protestant could
not have made those objections known prior to the actual new application in issue.
In those cases the protest should lie so long as the protestant meets the normal tests of
'
a "party in interest."57
From the foregoing, it can be seen that in most cases, the Commission has attempted to restrict the applicability of the "party in interest" concept, whereas the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has developed a rather liberal and
pragmatic test. It is enough that a potential for economic injury is present without
" Camden Radio v. FCC,
1S
2 2 R.R. 1427- (1955).

220 F.2d 191

(D.C. Cir. 1954).

'Sometimes meeting the test of a "party in interest" involves disputed issues of fact. One solution
acopted by the Commission has been to grant the protest, but include the issue of "standing" as one of
But cf. United Broadthe hearing issues. Prairie Broadcasting Co. (WPRE), x4 R.R. 520(g) (956).
casting Co. (KEEN), 13 R.R. 1309 (1956); Q Broadcasting Co., 14 R.R. 1168 (1957).
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regard to the express details of how the injury will occur or the degree to which it
will occur. This view by the court seems eminently proper in light of the clear
language of the section and the intention of Congress. Despite the evils of the
protest section, the Commission's attempt to limit its applicability is not the solution.
The Commission has attempted in still another way to limit the effectiveness of
section 309(c). The section expressly requires that the protestant "specify with
particularity the facts, matters, and things relied upon" to show that the grant would
not serve the public interest. The Commission has required protestants to plead their
entire case in considerable detail. As might be expected, this attempt to impose a
strict standard of particularity has led the Commission into the "never-never land"
of pleading, reminiscent of the early common law problems of defining an adequatecause of action.
In a very early case under the new section 309(c), the Commission set forth the
following test:"
A protestant must do something more than set forth in his protests vague, non-specific, condusionary arguments; he must allege those facts upon which his conclusion as to thethey (the
impropriety of the Commission's grant without a hearing are predicated ....
facts alleged) must be concrete, basic facts.
With this general statement, one cannot quarrel. Certainly, if the protestant claims
that a particular grant should not stand, then he should be able to set forth why this
is so, in sufficient detail to demonstrate the substantial nature of his charges. The
59
The Comdifficulty has been applying this general test to the particular cases.
forth.
and
back
mission, itself, has vacillated
For example, several years after having made the statement quoted above, and
after having denied a number of protests which were presumably defective by that
0
test, the Commission, in Coos County Broadcasters, permitted a protest to stand
even though it conceded that the matters alleged in the protest were entirely vagueand general. The Commission decided that the protest was not frivolous or sham
and that there was a "not insubstantial possibility" that a hearing might reveal merit
to the protestant's claim. This relaxation of the standard may have reflected, however, a deference to the court of appeals, for, as might be expected, the court hasstepped into this matter on several occasions.
In Federal Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC,"'the court set forth what is now
the accepted test of particularity:
[The protestant must] show in some detail the factual basis of his grievances. Generalized
objections are obviously insufficient under the statute without some specification of events
and circumstances. But neither are we to measure the requirement of Section 309(c) bythe technicalities of pleading formerly applicable in civil litigation. What is required is" T. E. Allen and Sons, 9 R.R. 59oa, 594 0953)- See also Patroon Broadcasting Co., 9 R.R. 638;

(7953).

" See e.g., Hyman Rosenblum, is R.R. 826 (1954).
eo 13 R.R. 625 (1956).
61225 F.2d 560, 563 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 923 (1955).
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merely an articulated statement of some fact or situation which would tend to show, if

established at a hearing, that the grant of the license contravened public interest ...
[Footnotes omitted.]

In a later case, FederalBroadcastingSystem, Inc. v. FCC,2 the court apparently even
went further in permitting the protest to stand, despite the lack of particularity. The
court said:
Only if it is clear from the face of the protest, taking all the protestant's allegations as true,
that there is no real merit in protestant's position or substantial possibility that a hearing
will reveal merit, should the protest be rejected without a hearing.
Despite the liberal judicial interpretation, the Commission continues to insist that
there must be allegations of basic fact not based on surmise or speculation." 3 This
insistence upon a detailed showing of basic facts will continue to cause doubt and
difficulty in future cases.
Still another fundamental problem has arisen in the administration of section
309(c), namely, that of defining the nature or scope of the hearing to be granted
where the Commission grants the protest. The Act itself, as enacted in 1952, gave
no particular insight into this problem. As expected, from the very beginning, the
Commission tried to limit the scope of the hearing. In T. E. Allen and Sons,"4 the
Commission ordered an oral argument en banc only. The Commission pointed out
that there were no disputed issues of fact and concluded that oral argument suffices
where questions of law and policy only are involved.
In Ohio Valley Broadcasting Corp."" this principle was extended substantially.
In that case, the Commission also permitted oral argument only. However, not only
were questions of law and policy involved, but also, one issue, that of concentration of
control, concerned facts about which the parties were in disagreement. The Commission said it would assume the truth of the facts alleged by protestant as if on
demurrer. During this same period of time, the Commission became plagued with
the so-called "economic injury protests," namely, protests filed by existing stations
claiming that their particular market could not support a new station and that this
financial inability of the market to support the newcomer was itself a reason for
denying the grant. When this problem first came up, the Commission decided that
oral argument only would suffice because this question involved a legal interpretation of the Sanders case, with factual allegations of secondary significance only.0 "
However, the court of appeals in the case of ClarksburgPublishing Co. v. FCC,07
brought an end to this type of summary oral argument, as if on demurrer. The
e0 231 F.2d 246, 250 (D.C. Cir. x956).
1

" See, e.g., WMIE-TV, ix R.R. io91 (1955); Richland (WMAN), 13 R.R. x 3 (x955); Lebanon
Broadcasting Co., 13 R.R. 388a (x956).
", Supra note 58, at 594a.
erIO R.R. 500 (1954).
"0 American Southern Broadcasters (WPWR), ii R.R. 1054 (i955); Radio Tifton (WTIF), ix R.R.

1167 (1955); Iredell Broadcasting Co., 12 R.R. 573 (1955); Southeastern Enterprises (WCLE), 12 R.R.
578 (1955).
07

225 F.2d

511 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
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Clarksburg case was an appeal from the earlier Ohio Valley case. This case involved
problems concerning the Multiple Ownership Rules, concentration of control and
diversification of the media of communication, and policies regarding the settlement

of comparative cases. The Commission had permitted oral argument only on these
matters. The court squarely held that the denial "rested on a seriously inadequate
record." 8 In a very sharp and critical opinion, the Commission was severely criticized for its handling of these protest cases, the court stating, "however unwittingly,
the Commission seems to have assumed the defense of its grant, rather than the
public interest, as its primary role in the proceedings." 9 Section 309(c), according
to the court, contemplates an evidentiary hearing where there are unresolved factual
issues, and more important, the Commission's inquiry should not be limited to the
facts alleged in the protest where the Commission has reason to believe that a full
evidentiary hearing may develop other relevant information not possessed by the
protestant. 70 Faced with the strong language of the court in the Clarksburg decision,
the Commission reversed its field and decided that the demurrer-type approach was
inappropriate. It first ordered full evidentiary hearings in the economic-injury
protests, finding that the legal and policy questions involved could best be determined
after factual evidence was fully adduced.7 ' It took an amendment to section 309(c),
however, to bring any real clarity into the law on this point.
By 1955, the public, the bar, and the Commission were becoming totally dissatisfied with the harshness and unfairness of the protest section. In the summer
of 1955, the Commission sent to Congress a proposed amendment to section 309(c).
In the letter to the Congress recommending a change in the Act, the then Chairman
George C. McConnaughey stated :72
The objective of the proposed legislation is to clarify the so-called "protest rule" contained
in Section 309(c) which was incorporated into the Communications Act by the Communications Act Amendments, 1952, 66 Stat. 711 so as to obviate the use of the new procedure
as a device for delaying radio stations grants which are in the public interest, while at
the same time retaining the rules' primary objective of providing interested parties with
a means by which they may bring to the Commission's attention bona fide questions
concerning grants made without hearing.
There are three principal means by which the new amendment improved the
1952 law. First, the new amendment eliminates the necessity for holding full
evidentiary hearings where the facts, even if proved, would not constitute grounds
for setting aside the grant; the Commission now has the express power to treat protests, where appropriate, as if on demurrer, granting oral argument only. Second,
es 225 F.2d at 553.
en Id. at 515.
'o Even if a totally new basis for denying a grant arises other than that stated in the protest, the
Commission must refuse to reinstate the grant. Hall v. FCC, 237 F.2d 567 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
"XRadio Tifton (WTIF), x2 R.R. 675 (I955).
72s R.R.
io:iioo (1955).
Commissioner John C. Doerfer, the present Chairman, attached
separate views requesting that the section be repealed entirely, claiming it "accomplishes no useful purpose." Ibid.
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-the Commission was given some discretion to keep in effect the authorization being
protested where the Commission finds that "the public interest requires that the
-grant remain in effect." Third, the new bill gives authority to the Commission to
redraft or rephrase issues urged by the protestant. The bill passed the House and
-the Senate and became law January 20, 1956.3
In some cases, the new law has been a great improvement. It has been helpful
in those cases where an oral argument suffices to develop all relevant matters. The
Commission commonly now uses this quick hearing rather than the full evidentiary
1iearing. 74 The new section has also been helpful in many cases of initial licensing.
Under the old provision, a competitor could invoke the mandatory stay provision
-so as to delay new competition, the only exception being where the grant was neces7 This, however, was a rare situation.
sary to the maintenance of an existing service.Y5
Now the Commission has the power to permit the grant being protested to remain
in effect if it finds affirmatively that the public interest requires it. For example, in
7" the Commission refused to stay the grant of a third
Coos County Broadcasters,
station in the market, though granting the protest. It refused a stay, because the
grantee proposed to operate the first independent station in the market, and also because a study of the allegations in the protest indicated that there was little likelihood
that the protestants would prevail on the merits of their protest. Without their stay,
the protestants immediately dismissed their protest, since they could no longer delay
the new service; the grantee got on with the business of providing a needed service
to this community at a much earlier date than would have been possible under the
old act. In other words, where a new authorization is involved and where it will
bring a needed service to the community, there is a good possibility that the stay
will not issue.77 If it cannot obtain a stay, the existing station is less likely to continue
the protest hearing. In any event, at least the Commission now has some discretion.
The major problem remaining in so far as stays are concerned, is whether transfer
and assignment grants will be stayed upon protest. Certainly, it will prove difficult
to avoid the stay upon the grant of a protest. After all, the transferor or assignor
has been operating the station; except upon a most unusual showing, it can presumably continue to operate. Therefore, it is difficult for the Commission to find
:a compelling reason why the public needs the service from the transferee as opposed
to service from the transferor. In some cases, it has been done; 7s but in most cases,
the stay has issued. 79 Thus, in the typical assignment or transfer case, the new
73

70 STAT. 3, 47 U.S.C. §309(c) (Supp. IV, 1957)-

e.g., Kaiser Hawaiian Village Radio (KHVH), 15 R.R. 76 (x957).
Curler Broadcasting Corp. v. FCC, 225 F.2d 23 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
78 13 R.R. 626 (1956).
"See, e.g., Wrather-Alvarez Broadcasting, 13 R.R. 754 (1956), If there is already adequate service
to the area, then, of course, the stay will issue. Kaiser Hawaiian Village Radio (KHVH), 15 R.R. 76
(957):
"70. R. Mitchell Motors, i4 R.R. 472d (z956); W. Wright Esch, 14 R.R, 471 (x956).
' 5 William E. Walker, r4 R.R. 526 (i956). A real nightmare has occurred in the case of Good Mbsic
Station, 14 R.R. 5r2 (1956), where the Commission changed its mind several times about the stay, and
Protestants were forced to go to court three times to protect their rights to the stay. Smith v. FCC,
247 F.2d zoo (D.C. Cir. 1957).
"See,

'Van
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section 309(c) has not been much help in preventing the filing of meritless protests.
The Commission continues to have trouble in finding clear and simple tests to
apply to protest proceedings. The constant changes in Commission position and the
frequent resort to the courts certainly does not lead to expeditious and effective administration. Therefore, it is believed that further amendments to section 3o9(c) are
in order. As Commissioner Doerfer said in an address before the Broadcast Advertising Club in Chicago, on October 29, 1956:
S..

today at least 30% of the time of our Examiners and our Office of Opinions and

Review, and at least 30% of the time of the Commissioners is spent in deciding protest
cases. Those, under the law, must be expedited. In most of them, the protestant has no
other objective than to delay the implementation of a broadcasting service. These people
love freedom of competition a good deal less than they love freedom from competition.
Nonetheless, a thorough study of these hobbling procedural laws will convince fair-minded
persons that much of the delay in the FCC is not the fault of the Commission.
Bills are now pending in Congress which would repeal section 3o9(c) entirely s °
Perhaps such a drastic measure is not necessary, but at least a much more thorough
amendment is necessary than that passed in 1956. Matters of the public interest are
primarily the responsibility of the Commission, not mere "private attorney generals"
whose principal interest is to prevent competition with their own stations. Any
interested party should have the right to call to the attention of the*Commission
errors of law or reasons why certain grants should not be made. The Commission
should act promptly and fairly on these complaints. However, the decision as to
whether the charges are so serious as to warrant a hearing and a stay of the grant
should rest within the Commission's discretion. If the Commission's discretion is
abused, the court of appeals is available to correct this abuse.
IV
RIGHT TO INTERVENE UNDER SECTION 3 o9 (b)

Another problem of interpretation under the 1952 amendments, which has proved
unnecessarily troublesome, has been that of determining who is entitled to intervene
in cases designated for hearing. The intervention provision of the Act, section
sl permits all "parties
in interest" to intervene, all with full hearing rights.
3 o9 (b),
Section 3 o9 (b) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
If the Commission, after considering such reply, shall be unable to make the finding
specified in subsection (a), it shall formally designate the application for hearing on the
grounds or reasons then obtaining and shall notify the applicant and all other known
parties in interest of such action and the grounds and reasons therefor, specifying with
particularity the matters and things in issue but not including issues or requirements
phrased generally. The parties in interest, if any, who are not notified by the Commission
of its action with respect to a particular application may acquire the status of a party to
8oS. 1577 (in Commerce Committee) and H.R. 4816 (in Commerce Committee), 85th Cong., ist
Sess. (,957).
" 66 STAT. 715, 47 U.S.C. §

3 09(b)

(x952).
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the proceeding thereon by filing a petition for intervention showing the basis for their
interest at any time not less than ten days prior to the date of hearing. Any hearing
subsequently held upon such application shall be a full hearing in which the applicant
and all other parties in interest shall be permitted to participate but in which both the
burden of proceeding with the introduction of evidence upon any issue specified by the
Commission, as well as the burden of proof upon all such issues, shall be upon the applicant.
It will be noted that the sole test of a proposed intervenor is that he file a petition
showing the "basis of [his] interest."
Obviously, the term "parties in interest" in this subsection means the same thing
as it does in connection with protest cases under section 309(c); thus, all the case law
defining "parties in interest" in protest cases is equally applicable to this subsection.
One whose claimed right of intervention is based upon objectionable interference had
clearly established intervention rights long prior to the 1952 amendments.8 2 So it
is only where intervention is based on economic injury that any problems have arisen.
Prior to 1939, the Commission permitted persons alleging that economic injury
would be caused by the grant of a certain application to intervene in the hearing as
of right. However, in 1939, a specific rule was adopted by the Commission, severely
limiting this right.8 3 In substance, this discretionary rule provided that if a person
sought intervention-on grounds other than electrical interference-then the petition
to intervene must show the nature of petitioner's interest and must show how such
person's participation would assist the Commission in the determination of the issues.
The Commission also reserved the right to permit intervention limited either as to
issues or as to the stages of the proceeding. This discretionary rule, where intervention was based on economic injury, has consistently been followed since 1939 and,
in fact, continued to be followed even after the passage of the 1952 amendments.
The language of the new section 3 o9 (b) has severely limited the Commission's
discretion in these cases. Yet, in the first case arising after passage of the new
section, the Commission refused to permit intervention; not because the intervenor
failed to show it was a party in interest, but because it had not shown how its
participation would assist the Commission in deciding the case."4 Thus, the Com-

mission used the same discretionary rule it had been applying since 1939. This same
principle was applied in other cases, and intervention was permitted only where the
intervenor set forth with particularity the nature of his proposed participation and
the benefit thereof.s5 Also, the Commission applied the other facet of its discretionary
intervention rule, permitting in some cases intervention on a limited basis only."'
As the Commission said in one case:87
The extent of an intervenor's participation is limited by his interests on the basis of
8
See Hazelwood, 7 F.C.C. 443, 444 (1939).
s 2 FCC v. NBC (KOA), 319 U.S. 239 (1943),'Niagara Frontier Amusement Corp., 3o R.R. 39 (1954).

:uIndependent Television, io R.R. 5io (1954); Allegheny Broadcasting Corp., zo R.R. 1181 (1954).
' See, e.g., St. Louis Telecast, xo R.R. 1185 (1954).
87
Allegheny Broadcasting Co., ioR.R. 1181, 1184 (9.54).

COMMUNICATIONS ACT AMENDMENTS,

1952

693

which he has obtained status as a party in interest, and he cannot explore issues with
respect to which he does not have an interest.
Finally, this problem came before the court of appeals. In Key Broadcasting
System,8 the Commission denied a petition to intervene, finding the the statement
of matters set forth was "conjectural and speculative and otherwise insufficient in
that it does not adequately state the nature of the facts it proposes to develop at the
hearing." The party seeking intervention appealed, claiming that since it was a
party in interest based on alleged economic injury, it was entitled as of right to
intervene, regardless of what facts it would develop in the hearing and whether or
not its participation would be helpful. The court of appeals agreed with the
appeflant's position and reversed the Commission. The court concluded that the
language of section 3o9 (b) requires only that "potential intervenors show the facts
demonstrating that they are 'parties in interest.'" When that showing is made,
"the Commission has exhausted its discretion; it may not deny intervention to a
party in interest merely because it thinks his participation would not aid its decisional process." 9 This decision has now clarified the intervention question. There
still remains the subsidiary question of whether or not, once entitled to intervene,
the intervenor has the right to participate on all issues, or whether the Commission
has power to limit his participation. The rationale of the Elm City case, as well as
the language of section 3o9 (b), would seem to indicate that if once found to be a
party in interest, then the intervenor can participate on all phases of the case.
The requirements of the new section 3 o9(b), as interpreted by the Elm City case,
have effectively destroyed the Commission's discretion. It is literally true that any
hearing is now open to participation by a number of different parties whose primary
interest is not in determining the proper party to receive the grant, but rather in
delaying a grant to anybody for as long a period as possible. Here, again, it is believed that some discretion should rest with the Commission to limit the number
of persons who can participate and to limit the scope of their participation. The
1952 amendments, by destroying this discretion, have only caused delay, expense, and
more lengthy proceedings.
V
"ECONOMIC INJURY" PROTESTS

One of the most insidious by-products of the 1952 amendments-and a totally un-

foreseen one-has been the continued assertion of the principle that economic injury
to existing stations may be, under certain circumstances, a basis for denying a new
grant. It will be recalled that in the case of FC 1 v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station,
the Court adopted two principles: (I) economic injury to an existing station, apart
from public interest considerations, is not a factor the Commission must consider in
passing on new applications, and (2) economic injury is sufficient to show standing as
ss See Elm City Broadcastinz Corp. v. United States, 235 F.2d 8I,
"Id. at 816.

814 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
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a party in interest. The Supreme Court emphasized that broadcasting was a business
of free competition and not regulated like common carriers; that it was the intention
of Congress "to permit a licensee who is not interfering electrically with other broadcasters to survive or succumb according to his ability to make his programs attractive
to the public." The Court added a cautionary word to the effect that questions of
competition were not to be entirely disregarded, for such questions"
... may have a vital and important bearing upon the ability of the applicant adequately
to serve his public; it may indicate that both stations-the existing and the proposedwill go under, with the result that a portion of the listening public will be left without
adequate service; it may indicate that, by a division of the field, both stations will be
compelled to render inadequate service.

This cautionary language has formed the basis recently for a general assault on
the basic principle that economic injury to an existing station is not a grounds for
denying a new license. Many protests since the 1952 amendments have claimed
that the adverse effects which new competition will have in their market are so
serious as to involve public interest considerations and that even though the
protestants personally are lawfully entitled to no protection, the public will suffer
grievous injury and loss of service if a new station is permitted to operate in their
market."
The Commission has been entirely unsympathetic with these assertions. In fact,
these arguments were not new. They began almost immediately after the Sanders
decision in i94o. But the Commission had consistently refused to consider them."
As late as 195o, in the case of Voice of Cullman, 3 the Commission expressly refused
to consider the economic effect which would be caused by the entry into the market
of a second station. The decision was based on policy grounds: broadcasting, being
a business of free competition, inevitably involves the risk of failure, and any prediction of what effect new competition will have in the future is so totally speculative
and conjectural that the Commission ought not to engage in such "crystal ball
gazing."
This decision appeared to set the matter at rest. But with the passage of the
1952 amendments and the tremendous emphasis placed therein upon the procedural
rights of existing stations to object to new grants, once again the principle of freedom
from competition, rather than freedom of competition, began to emerge. It is fair
to conclude that since the adoption of the 1952 amendments, the Commission has
handled this problem very poorly. This principle was urged very shortly after
adoption of the new section 3o9(c). Yet, it was not until March 1957 that the
Commission finally issued a definitive opinion disposing of the question. For
00 399 U.S. at 475-76.
"'See, e.g., Radio Tifton (WTIF), ii
(WCLE), 12 R.R. 578 (1955).
"See,

R.R. 1167, 12 R.R. 675 (1955); Southeastern Enterprises

e.g., Telegraph Herald (KDTH), 8 F.C.C. 322

F.C.C. 3 (1940).
" 6 R.R. 164 (1950).

(1940); Presque IsleBroadcasting Co., 8
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almost five years, these cases kept arising to plague the Commission and the public
and to delay the advent of new and needed service.
Despite the Commission's vacillation and indecision, it is not wholly to blame;
the amendments, themselves, contributed to the emergence of this principle of freedom from competition. If economic injury gives one the right to object, protest, or
intervene, it becomes extremely difficult to prevent such objector from asserting that
very injury as a basis for denial of the grant in issue. Of course, the objector will
clothe his objections in "public interest" terms, but basically, the ultimate end sought
is the denial or delay of the new grant, so that the existing station can retain unmolested its economic position in the market. To some in the broadcasting business,
this has been an extremely unfortunate development. Persons who are losing money
are encouraged to utilize the protest procedures to reduce their deficits at the expense
of the public. Persons who are doing handsomely as monopolists in their markets
are encouraged to protest so as to protect their monopoly. Once the principle is
established-however innocendy-that the Commission will protect competitors under some conditions, then there is no end to the clamor for protection at all levels,
under all conditions. What is now a free industry will become a regulated industry.
Most broadcasters would agree that they would rather run the risks inherent in a
free competitive system than accept a regulated economy such as is now applicable
to common carriers. It is, therefore, extremely unfortunate that the 1952 amendments
have created an atmosphere whereby certain broadcasters are encouraged to utilize
commission procedures as a means of securing government protection solely for
their private interests.
Fortunately, in March 1957, the Commission handed down a decision which
should have the effect of discouraging once and for all these economic protests where
protection is sought against further competition. In the case of Southeastern Enterprises (WCLE), 4 the Commission expressly refused to consider the question of
competition stating that:
We take this opportunity now to disclaim any power to consider the effects of legal
competition upon the public service in the field of broadcasting.
This was an extremely strong statement; before this case, the refusal to consider
economic questions had rested solely on policy grounds, not on any asserted lack of
legal authority. 5 There has been considerable criticism that the Commission went
too far in the Southeastern Enterprisescase. However, if it did, and no court has yet
considered the question, the harm has been minimized by certain decisions issued
since the Southeastern Enterprises case. In these later cases, the Commission has
added an alternative ground to its claimed lack of legal authority to consider eco-

04 22

F.C.C. 605, 13 R.R. 139 (1957).

" Two
of appeals:
(D.C. Cir.
protestants

"' Voice of Cullman, 6 R.R. 164 (1950).

abortive attempts were made to challenge the Southeastern Enterprises decision in the court
Television Corporation of America v. FCC, No. 13,803; Fitch & Kyle v. FCC, No. 13,868
June 5, 1957). In both cases, after losing requests for stays in the court of appeals, the
dismissed their appeals.
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nomics; it now holds that even if it had the legal authority, it would not exercise
it as a matter of policy, citing the Voice of Cudlman case. 7

Thus, both as a matter of law and policy, the Commission has now decided it
will not consider the effects of competition upon existing stations in determining
whether to grant new licenses. Nevertheless, the 1952 amendments still give substantial procedural rights based solely on the economic interests of the person asserting
the rights. In many of these situations, the Commission's discretion is still severely
limited. It is believed, therefore, that until the 1952 Act is amended further to increase the Commission's discretion, the emphasis upon competitive injury still looms
too large in the regulatory scheme.
VI
CONCLUSION

There has been an attempt to set forth in the preceding pages the results of five
years' experience under the Communications Act Amendments, 1952. It is believed
that in large part, these amendments have failed to accomplish their purpose and
have, in fact, caused delay, expense, and hardship. There are many provisions in the
1952 amendments which have not been discussed. These, by and large, have been of
substantial benefit. For example, the provision of section 312,"' whereby the Commission was given the power to issue "cease and desist" orders, has been of value in
that it has increased the flexibility with which the Commission can deal with
violators of the Act and Rules?' So also, certain provisions pertaining to the
appeal sections of the Act, section 402(a) and (b),' 0 have clarified the law and

simplified the appeal procedures. This also is beneficial. Indeed, certain features
of the sections discussed and criticized in some detail above have been of value to the
administrative process.
Despite these and other advantages resulting from the 1952 amendments, it is

believed generally the major fault of the amendments has been that too much discretion has been taken away from the Commission. There is no other governmental
agency which operates within so confining a procedural framework. Experience
shows that the withdrawal of discretionary powers does not make for a better administration or a fairer result. The true answer lies in an informed agency conscientiously exercising its authority in a fair and judicious manner. Essential to this
objective is a delegation of sufficiently broad authority, so that the Commission can
intelligently and fairly cope with the complex problems of this dynamic industry.
07 6 R.R. 164 (1950).
Kaiser Hawaiian Village Radio, 22 F.C.C. 941, 15 R.R. 84a (x957); West
Georgia Broadcasting Co. (WWCS), x4 R.R. 275 (1957).
1166 STAr. 716, 47 U.S.C. § 312 (1952).
C. J. Community Services, Inc., v. FCC, 246 F.2d 66o (D.C. Cir. 1957).
C
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